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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











DEBRA ROMBERGER,  
Director of Vital Records and in her individual capacity  
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 2-12-cv-00799) 
District Judge: Honorable Gary L. Lancaster 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 27, 2013 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 






SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
Zere Kushi alleges that Debra M. Romberger, the Director of the Division of Vital 
Records for the Pennsylvania Department of Health, improperly denied his application 
for an amended birth certificate in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process 
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Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, and the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, as well as the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738.  The District 
Court dismissed Kushi’s claims without prejudice for lack of ripeness.  We will affirm.   
I. 
 Kushi was born Albert Ulysses Rorie.  Since 1994, Kushi has legally changed his 
name multiple times.  In 1994, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 
Pennsylvania granted Kushi’s request to change his name to Shakir Abdul Awwal.  In 
1999, the same court granted his request to change his name to Shakir Hombre.  Kushi 
then obtained an amended birth certificate from the Division of Vital Records for the 
Pennsylvania Department of Health (the “Division”) reflecting the changes to his name.  
In 2006, the District Court of Clark County, Nevada granted Kushi’s request to change 
his name to Abel Kushman.  Most recently, in 2007, the same Nevada court granted 
Kushi’s request to change his name to Zere Kushi.     
 Kushi applied to the Division for an amended birth certificate to reflect this most 
recent name change.  Kushi included the Nevada name change orders with his 
application.  The Division initially denied Kushi’s application on two grounds.  First, 
according to a letter written by Romberger, in 2008, Kushi presented a driver’s license 
that was tampered with or otherwise falsified.  Second, the Nevada orders were issued 
based upon petitions that lacked information the Division required to maintain the 
integrity of its records.  Kushi argued that the denial of his application violated the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause.  Kushi appealed to the Pennsylvania Secretary of Health, but 
after an attorney from the Division informed Kushi that the denial of his application was 
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without prejudice, Kushi withdrew his appeal and reapplied for an amended birth 
certificate. 
 In response to Kushi’s second application, Romberger sent Kushi a letter 
requesting additional documentation.  Citing the same two reasons she raised in response 
to his first application, Romberger requested documentation establishing that Kushi had 
never been convicted of a felony and that Kushi was not changing his name for a 
fraudulent reason.  Romberger also requested proof of publication of Kushi’s intent to 
change his name in two newspapers of general circulation to ensure that the name change 
would not compromise the integrity of the Division’s vital statistics records. 
 Kushi did not submit the requested information but, instead, filed a civil rights 
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking a judgment declaring that Romberger’s 
refusal to amend his birth certificate violated his constitutional rights, an injunction 
prohibiting Romberger from refusing to amend the birth certificate, and attorneys’ fees 
and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  Romberger filed a motion to dismiss.  The District 
Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of ripeness.
1
  
Because the Court did not reach the merits of Kushi’s claims, the dismissal was without 
prejudice.  Kushi now appeals, arguing only that the District Court erroneously found that 
his Full Faith and Credit claims were not ripe. 
II. 
                                              
1
 The District Court correctly raised the issue of ripeness sua sponte.  Peachlum v. 
City of York, Pa., 333 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 2003) (“This court has recognized that 
considerations of ripeness are sufficiently important that the court is required to raise the 
issue sua sponte even though the parties do not.”). 
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 Kushi alleged that the District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
  Review of a ripeness determination 
is plenary.  Peachlum v. City of York, Pa., 333 F.3d 429, 433 n.7 (3d Cir. 2003).   
III. 
 Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine that seeks to “determine whether a party has 
brought an action prematurely and counsels abstention until such time as a dispute is 
sufficiently concrete to satisfy the constitutional and prudential requirements of the 
doctrine.”  Khodara Envtl., Inc. v. Blakey, 376 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Peachlum, 333 F.3d at 433).  In a case about an agency’s action, the purpose of the 
ripeness doctrine is to prevent courts “from entangling themselves in abstract 
disagreements over administrative policies” and to protect an agency from “judicial 
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a 
concrete way by the challenging parties.”  Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 
(1967), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).  To 
determine ripeness in such cases, courts examine: (1) “the fitness of the issues for judicial 
                                              
2
 Generally, an order dismissing a case without prejudice is not an appealable final 
order unless the plaintiff has specifically elected to stand on the complaint.  Borelli v. 
City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  We have held, 
however, that this principle does not apply “where the district court has dismissed based 
on justiciability and it appears that the plaintiffs could do nothing to cure their 
complaint.”  Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 
1461 n.6 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 162-63 
(3d Cir. 2007).  This is the case here: the District Court dismissed Kushi’s claims as 
unripe, and Kushi could not amend his complaint to cure this defect.  We therefore have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
5 
 
decision” and (2) “the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.”3  
Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149; see also Nextel Commc’ns of Mid-Atl., Inc. v. City of 
Margate, 305 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2002).  We next examine each factor. 
A. 
 To determine whether an issue is fit for judicial review, we consider:  
factors such as whether the agency action is final; whether the issue 
presented for decision is one of law which requires no additional factual 
development; and whether further administrative action is needed to clarify 
the agency’s position, for example, when the challenged prescription is 
discretionary so that it is unclear if, when or how the agency will employ it. 
 
Nextel, 305 F.3d at 193 (quoting Felmeister v. Office of Attorney Ethics, a Div. of the 
N.J. Admin. Office of the Courts, 856 F.2d 529, 535-36 (3d Cir. 1988)).  
Although the issue in this case is largely legal and does not appear to require 
significant factual development, we conclude that this case is not sufficiently fit for 
judicial review because the Division has not made a final determination with respect to 
Kushi’s second application.  See Univ. of Med. and Dentistry of N.J. v. Corrigan, 347 
F.3d 57, 69 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that a primarily legal issue that did not require 
additional fact finding was not fit for judicial review because the agency action was not 
                                              
3
 Some agency actions result in coercing a party to comply with a statute or 
regulation and the ripeness of such cases is examined under a more relaxed standard.  A 
more lenient standard is used because the potential agency decision may force the party 
to comply with a particular statute or regulation or face a penalty.  Peachlum, 333 F.3d at 
435-36 (discussing Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 
1990)).  Here, Kushi has initiated an administrative process with the agency asking it to 
take an action.  The agency has not yet reached a final decision, but whatever the decision 
is, it will not coerce Kushi to take an action to avoid a penalty.  Thus, the ripeness 
analysis in this case is stricter and focuses on “whether the courts should intervene as a 
prudential matter in a dispute that is in the process of being pursued administratively.”  
Peachlum, 333 F.3d at 436.   
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final); CEC Energy Co. v. Pub. Ser. Comm’n of V.I., 891 F.2d 1107, 1110 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(holding that the “finality” of an agency action depends in part on “whether the decision 
represents the agency’s definitive position on the question.”).  At this point, the Division 
has only requested additional documentation.  Instead of complying with this request, 
informing the Division that he viewed the request as illegitimate, or obtaining a final 
decision, Kushi filed suit.  Allowing the Division to reach a decision will enable it to both 
rule on the application and provide reasons for its decision.  See Nextel, 305 F.3d at 193-
94. 
Moreover, even if the Division denies Kushi’s application, he may avail himself of 
the administrative appeal process.
4
  On appeal, the Secretary of Health may overturn the 
denial, which may eliminate any need for judicial review.  Corrigan, 347 F.3d at 69 
(noting that “‘[j]udicial intervention into the agency process denies the agency an 
opportunity to correct its own mistakes,’” assuming any mistakes were made (quoting 
FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980)).  Given these various issues 
and potential outcomes, “further administrative action is needed to clarify the agency’s 




                                              
4
 Kushi also has not sought review of the Division’s document demand.  The 
Secretary may reconsider Kushi’s arguments and reassess the request for additional 
documentation for any number of reasons, including reasons unrelated to the merits of 
Kushi’s Full Faith and Credit argument, or explain why they are needed and thereby 
clarify the Division’s position.     
5
 The existence of an appeals process is relevant to whether the Division has made 
its “ultimate decision.”  Nextel, 305 F.3d at 194.  
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Thus, the absence of administrative finality shows the present dispute is not yet 




 Kushi has not shown sufficient “hardship” to support judicial consideration of his 
claim at this time.  For a party’s “‘hardship to be sufficient to overcome prudential 
interests in deferral, that hardship must be both immediate and significant.’”  Nextel, 305 
F.3d at 194 (quoting Felmeister, 856 F.2d at 537).  Kushi asserts that he has suffered 
hardship from the costs of challenging the Division’s process and from his inability to 
obtain a passport and a federally compliant driver’s license.   
 Neither of these circumstances presents a hardship that overcomes the lack of 
fitness for judicial review.  First, the potential costs from participating in further litigation 
or administrative proceedings in this case cannot constitute a hardship sufficient to justify 
immediate review of an otherwise unripe claim.  The Supreme Court has “not considered 
. . . litigation cost saving sufficient by itself to justify review in a case that would 
otherwise be unripe.”  Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 735 (1998).  
Additionally, in all but the most complex and burdensome cases where the administrative 
                                              
6
 Kushi attempts to sidestep the finality factor by relying on Doe v. Cnty. of 
Centre, PA, 242 F.3d 437 (3d Cir. 2001), which involved an application to be a foster 
parent.  In Doe, we held that the plaintiffs’ claims based on racially discriminatory 
restrictions in the application process were ripe even though the relevant state agency had 
not yet denied the application.  242 F.3d at 452-53.  The Doe plaintiffs’ allegations of 
racial discrimination in the application process were separate from the outcome of their 
application.  Thus, the ripeness inquiry did not depend on the grant or denial of their 
application.  Here, Kushi alleges that the denial of his application would violate the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Act.  Because Kushi’s claims 




process itself is at issue, administrative expenses do not constitute a hardship to support 
ripeness.  NE Hub Partners v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 345-46 (3d Cir. 
2001) (stating that costs of administrative proceedings can constitute hardship where 
plaintiff claimed that an “expensive and time-consuming state process” was preempted 
by federal law).  The administrative process Kushi faces does not rise to this level.  Here, 
Kushi is not challenging the legality of the entire administrative matrix but rather 
complains about what he is being asked to do as part of a straightforward application 
process that he has not yet completed.  The burdens imposed by litigation and the 
administrative process are “part of the social burden of living under government.”  
Corrigan, 347 F.3d at 70 (quoting Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. at 244).  Thus, 
Kushi’s litigation and administrative expenses do not constitute hardship for ripeness 
purposes. 
Second, as to the hardship from the inability to obtain a passport or driver’s 
license, Kushi does not allege that he has even applied for these documents or allege that 
these applications have been denied.  Moreover, he does not point to any reason why the 
applications would necessarily be denied without the amended birth certificate.  Such a 
speculative consequence is not enough to overcome our conclusion that Kushi’s claims 
are not presently fit for judicial review.  In short, the “fitness/hardship balance . . . tip[s] 
in support of the non-ripeness determination.”  Felmeister, 856 F.2d at 538. 
IV. 
 For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing this 
case without prejudice for lack of ripeness.    
